91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 & Anti-Defection Law: Provisions, Impact, and Political Reforms

The 91st Amendment Act (2003) and Anti-Defection Law: Strengthening Democratic Accountability in India

Introduction

The Indian democratic framework, while robust, has faced its share of challenges, one of the most significant being the phenomenon of political defections. The lure of office or other considerations often led legislators to switch allegiances, undermining electoral mandates and fostering political instability. To address this, the Anti-Defection Law was introduced in 1985 via the 52nd Amendment Act, adding the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. However, certain lacunae in this law necessitated further strengthening, leading to the enactment of the 91st Amendment Act in 2003.

This blog post delves deep into the intricacies of the Anti-Defection Law and the crucial changes brought about by the 91st Amendment. We will explore the constitutional provisions, landmark judgments, the roles of key institutions, contemporary developments, and critically analyze their impact on the Indian political landscape. This comprehensive guide is designed for students, aspirants of competitive examinations (UPSC, State PSCs), educators, and researchers seeking a thorough understanding of this vital aspect of Indian Polity.

Foundational Concepts: Understanding Political Defection

Before we dissect the legal framework, let's understand what "defection" entails in the political context. Simply put, political defection refers to the act by an elected representative of abandoning allegiance to or support for the political party under whose banner they were elected, often to join an opposing party or remain independent. This act can be driven by various motivations, including:

• Lure of ministerial berths or other public offices.
• Monetary inducements.
• Ideological disagreements (though less common as a primary driver for defection that attracts legal scrutiny).
• Dissatisfaction with party leadership or functioning.

The primary concern with defections is that they betray the trust of the electorate who voted for a candidate based on their party affiliation and a collective manifesto. Unchecked defections can lead to:

• Government instability: Frequent shifts in party loyalties can cause governments to fall prematurely.
• Erosion of public trust: It fosters cynicism among citizens about the political process and politicians.
• Horse-trading and corruption: It can encourage unethical practices to secure a majority.
• Undermining of party discipline: It weakens the internal coherence and functioning of political parties.

Historical Background: The Genesis of Anti-Defection Measures

The problem of political defections, colloquially known as 'Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram' (a phrase coined in 1967 after a Haryana MLA, Gaya Lal, changed parties thrice in a fortnight), plagued Indian politics for decades after independence. Several attempts were made to address this issue:

• The Chavan Committee (1969): This committee, headed by Y.B. Chavan, was one of the earliest to examine the issue of defections and recommend legislative measures. It suggested disqualifying defectors from holding public office for a certain period.
• The 32nd Constitutional Amendment Bill (1973): This bill was introduced in Parliament but lapsed due to the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. It aimed to disqualify defectors.
• The 48th Constitutional Amendment Bill (1979): This bill also failed to pass.

The political instability of the 1970s and early 1980s, marked by frequent toppling of state governments due to defections, created a strong impetus for a concrete anti-defection law. This culminated in the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, during the tenure of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The Anti-Defection Law: The Tenth Schedule (52nd Amendment Act, 1985)

The 52nd Amendment Act introduced the Tenth Schedule to the Indian Constitution, laying down the provisions for disqualification of Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of State Legislatures (MLAs/MLCs) on the grounds of defection.

Key Provisions of the Tenth Schedule (Original):

• Grounds for Disqualification:

  • Voluntarily giving up membership: If an elected member of a political party voluntarily resigns from their party. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to include conduct other than formal resignation, such as publicly opposing the party or supporting another.
  • Voting or abstaining contrary to party direction (whip): If a member votes or abstains from voting in the House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which they belong, without obtaining prior permission of the party, and such act has not been condoned by the party within 15 days.
  • Independent Member joining a political party: If an elected independent member joins any political party after such election.
  • Nominated Member joining a political party after six months: If a nominated member joins any political party after the expiry of six months from the date they take their seat in the House.

• Exceptions to Disqualification (as originally enacted): The Tenth Schedule initially provided two major exceptions to disqualification:

  • Split: If a group of legislators constituting one-third of the members of a legislature party decided to leave the party, it was considered a "split," and they would not be disqualified. This provision became highly controversial and was seen as encouraging mass defections.
  • Merger: A party could merge with another party if at least two-thirds of its legislature party members agreed to the merger. In such a scenario, neither the members who agreed to the merger nor those who stayed with the original party faced disqualification.

• Deciding Authority: The Presiding Officer of the House (Speaker in the case of Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, and Chairman in the case of Rajya Sabha and State Legislative Councils) was designated as the authority to decide on questions of disqualification arising under the Tenth Schedule.

• Bar on Jurisdiction of Courts: Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule originally barred the jurisdiction of courts in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member under the Schedule.

Constitutional Articles Primarily Concerned:

• Article 102(2) (for MPs) and Article 191(2) (for MLAs/MLCs): These articles state that a person shall be disqualified for being a member of either House of Parliament or the State Legislature if they are so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule.

The Need for the 91st Amendment Act, 2003

While the Tenth Schedule was a landmark step, it soon became apparent that it had certain shortcomings:

• The "Split" Provision (Paragraph 3): The exception for splits, requiring only one-third of members, was widely misused. Instead of curbing individual defections, it inadvertently legalized wholesale defections, often engineered to topple governments. This provision became a significant loophole.
• Office of Profit: Defectors were often lured with the promise of ministerial positions or other remunerative political posts, which was not adequately addressed by the 52nd Amendment.
• Size of Council of Ministers: There was no cap on the size of the Council of Ministers, leading to bloated cabinets formed to accommodate defectors and allies, putting a strain on the public exchequer.
• Delay in Decision by Presiding Officer: The law did not prescribe a time limit for the Presiding Officer to decide on a disqualification petition, leading to instances where defectors continued to be part of the House and even support or topple governments while their disqualification petitions were pending.

These issues led to persistent demands for electoral reforms and strengthening of the anti-defection law. The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990) and the Law Commission of India in its 170th Report on Reform of Electoral Laws (1999) recommended the deletion of the split provision and a cap on the size of the Council of Ministers.

The 91st Amendment Act, 2003: Plugging the Loopholes

The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, was a significant legislative measure aimed at addressing the deficiencies of the original Anti-Defection Law and curbing political opportunism.

Key Changes Introduced by the 91st Amendment Act:

1. Limiting the Size of the Council of Ministers:

   • Article 75(1A): This new clause stipulated that the total number of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, in the Union Council of Ministers shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.
   • Article 164(1A): Similarly, this clause mandated that the total number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in the Council of Ministers in a State shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Legislative Assembly of that State.
   • It also provided that the number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in a State shall not be less than 12.
   • Rationale: This was to prevent the formation of excessively large cabinets merely to accommodate defectors or allies, thereby reducing the incentive for defection driven by the lure of ministerial posts.

2. Deletion of the "Split" Provision (Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule):

   • The most crucial change was the omission of Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, which had allowed exemption from disqualification in case of a 'split' involving one-third of the members of a legislature party.
   • Impact: This meant that defectors could no longer seek protection under the guise of a "split." Any legislator leaving their party, individually or in a group smaller than that required for a "merger," would now face disqualification. The only exception remaining was a "merger" (Paragraph 4).

3. Disqualification from Holding Remunerative Political Posts:

   • Article 75(1B) and Article 164(1B): These clauses provided that a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly/Council of a State belonging to any political party who is disqualified on the ground of defection shall also be disqualified to hold any remunerative political post for the duration of the period commencing from the date of their disqualification till the date on which the term of their office as such member would expire or till the date on which they contest an election to a House and are declared elected, whichever is earlier.
   • Definition of "Remunerative Political Post": The Act also defined "remunerative political post" to mean any office under the Government of India or the Government of a State where the salary or remuneration for such office is paid out of the public revenue of the respective government, or any office under a body, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or partially owned by the Government of India or the Government of a State and the salary or remuneration for such office is paid by such body, except where such salary or remuneration is compensatory in nature.
   • Rationale: This was intended to remove another major incentive for defection – the promise of lucrative government positions outside the Council of Ministers.

4. Strengthening Provisions Regarding Disqualification:

   • While the 91st Amendment did not directly amend the grounds for disqualification or the role of the Presiding Officer, by removing the split provision, it made the existing grounds more stringent.

Constitutional Articles Amended/Inserted by the 91st Amendment:

• Article 75: Clauses (1A) and (1B) were inserted.
• Article 164: Clauses (1A) and (1B) were inserted.
• Tenth Schedule: Paragraph 3 was omitted.
• Article 361B: This new article was inserted to provide for the disqualification for appointment on remunerative political post for defecting legislators.

Visual Aids for Conceptual Clarity

Diagram 1: Evolution of Anti-Defection Measures

graph TD
    A[Problem: Political Defections <br> 'Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram' Era] --> B{Early Attempts <br> (Chavan Committee, <br> Lapsed Bills)};
    B --> C[52nd Amendment Act, 1985 <br> (Tenth Schedule Introduced)];
    C --> D{Key Features of Original Law: <br> - Grounds for Disqualification <br> - Exception: Split (1/3rd) <br> - Exception: Merger (2/3rd) <br> - Deciding Authority: Presiding Officer};
    D --> E{Loopholes Observed: <br> - Misuse of Split Provision <br> - Lure of Office/Large Cabinets};
    E --> F[91st Amendment Act, 2003];
    F --> G{Key Reforms by 91st Amendment: <br> - Council of Ministers size capped at 15% <br> - Split Provision (Para 3) OMITTED <br> - Disqualification from Remunerative Political Posts};
    G --> H[Strengthened Anti-Defection Framework];

Explanation: This flowchart illustrates the timeline and progression of anti-defection laws in India, starting from the identification of the problem to the enactment of the 91st Amendment Act, highlighting the key changes and their objectives.

Comparison Table 1: Anti-Defection Law - Before and After the 91st Amendment

Explanation: This table provides a clear side-by-side comparison of the legal provisions concerning defections before and after the 91st Amendment, making it easy to understand the specific changes and their implications.

Diagram 2: Disqualification Process under the Tenth Schedule (Post 91st Amendment)

graph TD
    A[Legislator commits an act potentially attracting disqualification under Tenth Schedule <br> (e.g., voluntarily gives up membership, votes against whip)] --> B{Petition Filed with Presiding Officer <br> (Speaker/Chairman)};
    B --> C{Presiding Officer Examines Petition <br> (Principles of Natural Justice to be followed)};
    C --> D{Decision by Presiding Officer: <br> - Disqualified <br> - Not Disqualified};
    D -- Disqualified --> E[Seat becomes Vacant];
    E --> F[Disqualified member also barred from remunerative political posts <br> (Art. 361B)];
    D -- Not Disqualified --> G[Member continues];
    D --> H{Judicial Review <br> (Possible on limited grounds: <br> mala fides, perversity, violation of natural justice, non-compliance with constitutional provisions)};

Explanation: This flowchart outlines the process followed when a legislator is accused of defection, from the act of defection to the decision by the Presiding Officer and the possibility of judicial review.

Key Institutions and Roles: The Presiding Officer

The Presiding Officer of the legislature (Speaker of the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly, and Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or State Legislative Council) plays a pivotal role in the anti-defection mechanism.

• Adjudicatory Role: The power to decide whether a member stands disqualified under the Tenth Schedule vests solely with the Presiding Officer.
• Quasi-Judicial Function: While performing this role, the Presiding Officer acts as a tribunal and is expected to function in a fair and unbiased manner, adhering to the principles of natural justice.
• Finality of Decision (Subject to Judicial Review): Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule states that the decision of the Presiding Officer shall be final. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that this finality is subject to judicial review.

Challenges Associated with the Role of the Presiding Officer:

• Allegations of Partisanship: Since the Speaker/Chairman is usually a member of the ruling party (though expected to be impartial), their decisions have often been questioned for political bias.
• No Time Limit for Decision: A significant criticism is the absence of a specified timeframe within which the Presiding Officer must decide on a disqualification plea. This delay can, at times, render the entire process ineffective, as defecting members might continue to influence government formation or stability while their cases are pending. The Supreme Court has, in recent judgments, urged Presiding Officers to decide such petitions expeditiously, preferably within three months.
• Scope of Judicial Review: While judicial review is permissible, it is limited and does not extend to substituting the court's own judgment for that of the Presiding Officer on the merits of the case, unless the decision is vitiated by the grounds mentioned earlier.

Landmark Judgments and Case Laws

The interpretation and application of the Anti-Defection Law have been significantly shaped by various pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India.

1. Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and Others (1992):

   • Constitutional Validity of the Tenth Schedule: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule.
   • Scope of Judicial Review: Crucially, the Court struck down Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule, which had barred the jurisdiction of courts. It held that the Presiding Officer, while deciding disqualification petitions, functions as a tribunal and their decisions are subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, violation of constitutional mandates, and non-compliance with rules of natural justice. However, the Court clarified that judicial review should not be available at an interlocutory stage (i.e., before the Presiding Officer has made a decision).
   • Speaker's Role: It affirmed the Speaker's/Chairman's role as the adjudicating authority.
   • Impact: This judgment was monumental as it established the accountability of the Presiding Officer's decisions to the judiciary, preventing potential arbitrary use of power.

2. Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India (1994):

   • "Voluntarily Giving Up Membership": The Supreme Court broadened the interpretation of "voluntarily giving up membership of a political party." It held that this phrase could be inferred from the conduct of a member even without a formal resignation. Publicly expressing opposition to the party or supporting another party could be construed as voluntarily giving up membership.

3. G. Viswanathan vs. Hon'ble Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (1996):

   • The Court held that a member who is expelled from a party continues to be "unattached" but does not automatically become an independent member. If such an expelled member joins another political party later, they would be disqualified. This was to prevent expelled members from immediately joining other parties without consequences.

4. Rajendra Singh Rana vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others (2007):

   • Speaker's Inaction/Delay: The Court held that if the Speaker fails to act on a disqualification petition within a reasonable time, the High Court or Supreme Court can intervene. It emphasized that the Speaker's inaction cannot be a shield for defectors.
   • Incorrect Adjudication of "Split": This case also dealt with the incorrect recognition of a "split" (before the 91st Amendment) by the Speaker.

5. Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. The Hon’ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly & Ors. (2020):

   • Timely Decision by Speaker: The Supreme Court, expressing serious concern over delays in deciding disqualification petitions, urged Parliament to amend the Constitution to strip the Speaker of their exclusive power to adjudicate such cases and entrust it to an independent mechanism, like a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge or some other outside independent mechanism.
   • Recommended Timeframe: While not mandating, the Court strongly suggested that disqualification petitions should ideally be decided by Presiding Officers within a period of three months from the date of filing.
   • Interim Disqualification Power: The Court also hinted that if a Speaker fails to decide, the Court could potentially exercise its powers to disqualify members in exceptional circumstances to prevent constitutional logjams.

Contemporary Developments, Criticisms, and the Way Forward

Despite the 91st Amendment, the Anti-Defection Law continues to be a subject of debate and scrutiny.

Persisting Criticisms:

• Undermining Representative Democracy and Intra-Party Dissent: Critics argue that the law stifles the legislator's freedom of speech and conscience. They are compelled to toe the party line even if they disagree with it on genuine policy matters, thereby reducing them to mere delegates of the party rather than representatives of their constituents. Legitimate dissent within a party is often equated with defection.
• Role of the Presiding Officer: The issue of the Presiding Officer's impartiality and the delays in decision-making remain major concerns. The suggestion by the Supreme Court in the Keisham Meghachandra Singh case to establish an independent tribunal is yet to be acted upon.
• The "Merger" Loophole: While the "split" provision was deleted, the "merger" provision (requiring two-thirds of the legislature party) is still seen by some as a loophole that can be exploited through inducements to engineer mass defections, albeit on a larger scale.
• No Distinction Between Dissent and Defection: The law does not clearly distinguish between a conscientious objection to a party's policy and an opportunistic act of defection for personal gain.
• Impact on Legislative Scrutiny: The compulsion to follow the party whip on every vote, irrespective of the merit of the issue, can reduce the quality of legislative debate and scrutiny.
• Subversion through Resignations: A newer trend has been for legislators to resign from their seats to reduce the majority of the ruling party, leading to the fall of the government, and then re-contest on the ticket of the new ruling party. The anti-defection law does not directly cover disqualification for resigning.

Evolving Interpretations and Judicial Activism:

The judiciary has played a proactive role in trying to plug some of the gaps:

• By expanding the meaning of "voluntarily giving up membership."
• By emphasizing the need for timely decisions by Presiding Officers.
• By opening the door for judicial review of the Presiding Officer's decisions.

Suggested Reforms:

Several reforms have been suggested by various committees and experts:

1. Independent Adjudicatory Body: As recommended by the Supreme Court, establishing an independent tribunal or assigning this function to the Election Commission of India to decide on disqualification cases could ensure greater impartiality and speed.
2. Time-Bound Decisions: Prescribing a clear and binding time limit (e.g., 90 days) for the deciding authority to dispose of defection cases.
3. Restricting the Scope of the Whip: Some argue that the whip should be applicable only to critical votes that could threaten the stability of the government (e.g., no-confidence motions, money bills) and not to all legislative business, allowing legislators more freedom on ordinary legislation.
4. Clarifying "Voluntarily Giving Up Membership": Defining this ground more precisely to avoid ambiguity and potential misuse.
5. Addressing the Resignation Loophole: Exploring whether resigning to destabilize a government and subsequently joining another party should attract provisions of the anti-defection law or other penalties.
6. Voter Recall: Though complex to implement, some propose mechanisms for voters to recall legislators who defect.

Comparison with Global Systems (Brief Overview):

Anti-defection laws are not unique to India, though the specific mechanisms vary.

• United Kingdom: Party discipline is strong, but formal anti-defection laws like India's do not exist. "Crossing the floor" is rare and often has political consequences but not automatic disqualification from membership of Parliament. Emphasis is on party loyalty and whips.
• South Africa: Has provisions for loss of membership if a legislator ceases to be a member of the party that nominated them.
• Bangladesh and Kenya: Also have anti-defection laws.

The Indian model, with its specific constitutional provisions and the role of the Presiding Officer, is quite distinct. The debate often revolves around balancing party discipline and government stability with the legislator's role as a representative and their freedom of conscience.

Conclusion

The 91st Amendment Act, 2003, was a crucial intervention to fortify the Anti-Defection Law in India. By capping the size of ministries and, most importantly, by deleting the contentious "split" provision, it aimed to curb the politics of opportunism and promote stability. It underscored the principle that electoral mandates should be respected and that legislators cannot be allowed to switch allegiances for personal gain without consequence.

However, the journey of the anti-defection law is far from over. Challenges related to the impartiality and timeliness of decisions by Presiding Officers, the interpretation of "voluntarily giving up membership," and the need to balance party discipline with genuine intra-party dissent continue to fuel debate. The Supreme Court's proactive stance and the ongoing discussions about further reforms indicate that the law will continue to evolve.

Ultimately, while legal frameworks like the Tenth Schedule and the 91st Amendment are essential, the long-term solution to political defections also lies in fostering a political culture rooted in ethics, ideology, and accountability. For students and aspirants of Indian Polity, a nuanced understanding of these legal provisions, their historical context, judicial interpretations, and ongoing challenges is indispensable for appreciating the complexities of India's vibrant parliamentary democracy.

Interactive Q&A / Practice Exercises

Test your understanding of the 91st Amendment Act and the Anti-Defection Law with these exercises:

Multiple-Choice Questions (MCQs):

1. The 91st Amendment Act, 2003, primarily aimed to: (a) Introduce the Goods and Services Tax. (b) Strengthen the Panchayati Raj institutions. (c) Limit the size of the Council of Ministers and remove the "split" provision from the Tenth Schedule. (d) Grant constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes.

   Answer: (c) Explanation: The 91st Amendment's main objectives were to cap the size of ministries at 15% of the legislature's strength (Articles 75(1A) & 164(1A)) and to omit Paragraph 3 (the "split" provision) of the Tenth Schedule.

2. Under the 91st Amendment, the total number of ministers, including the Prime Minister, in the Union Council of Ministers shall not exceed: (a) 10% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha. (b) 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha. (c) 20% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha. (d) A number decided by the President.

   Answer: (b) Explanation: Article 75(1A) of the Constitution, inserted by the 91st Amendment, caps the size of the Union Council of Ministers at 15% of the total strength of the Lok Sabha.

3. Which paragraph of the Tenth Schedule, dealing with exemption from disqualification in case of a 'split', was omitted by the 91st Amendment Act? (a) Paragraph 2 (b) Paragraph 3 (c) Paragraph 4 (d) Paragraph 6

   Answer: (b) Explanation: Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, which allowed one-third of the members of a legislature party to form a separate group without inviting disqualification, was deleted by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003.

4. Who is the deciding authority in matters of disqualification of a Member of Parliament under the Tenth Schedule? (a) The President of India (b) The Election Commission of India (c) The Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, as the case may be (d) The Supreme Court of India

   Answer: (c) Explanation: Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule designates the Presiding Officer of the House (Speaker/Chairman) as the authority to decide on disqualification on grounds of defection.

5. The Supreme Court case that upheld the validity of the Tenth Schedule but struck down the provision barring judicial review of the Speaker's decision was: (a) S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (b) Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (c) Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and Others (d) Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India

   Answer: (c) Explanation: In Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and Others (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Schedule's constitutionality but held that Paragraph 7, which barred judicial review, was unconstitutional. It established that the Speaker's decision is subject to judicial review.

Scenario-Based Question:

Scenario: In a State Legislative Assembly with a total strength of 100 members, Party X has 60 MLAs. After a disagreement with the party leadership, 15 MLAs from Party X announce that they are forming a new group and will no longer follow Party X's whip. They do not merge with any other party. The leader of Party X files a petition with the Speaker for their disqualification.

Question: What is the likely outcome for these 15 MLAs under the Anti-Defection Law as it stands after the 91st Amendment Act? Explain your reasoning.

Answer and Explanation: The 15 MLAs are likely to be disqualified. Here's why:

• No "Split" Provision: The 91st Amendment Act, 2003, deleted Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule, which allowed for a "split" if one-third of the legislature party members defected. Therefore, these 15 MLAs cannot claim exemption under the split provision.
• Voluntarily Giving Up Membership/Defying Whip: Their act of forming a new group and announcing they will not follow Party X's whip can be construed as either "voluntarily giving up membership" of Party X (as interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court in cases like Ravi S. Naik) or as defying the party whip, both of which are grounds for disqualification under Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule.
• No Merger: The scenario states they have not merged with another party. For a valid merger, two-thirds of the legislature party members of Party X (i.e., 2/3 of 60 = 40 MLAs) would need to agree to merge with another party. Since only 15 MLAs are involved, this does not qualify as a merger under Paragraph 4.
• Decision by Speaker: The Speaker, upon receiving the petition, will examine the facts. Given the current legal position, the Speaker is likely to disqualify these 15 MLAs.

Match the Following:

Answers:

1. -> (d)
2. -> (c)
3. -> (a)
4. -> (b)
5. -> (e)

Explanation:

1. Article 75(1A), introduced by the 91st Amendment, limits the size of the Union Council of Ministers to 15% of Lok Sabha's strength.
2. Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule outlines the grounds on which a member can be disqualified for defection (voluntarily giving up membership, voting against party whip, etc.).
3. Article 361B, also inserted by the 91st Amendment, disqualifies a defecting member from holding any remunerative political post.
4. The Kihoto Hollohan case is landmark because the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the anti-defection law but made the Speaker's/Chairman's decision subject to judicial review.
5. The omission of Paragraph 3 (the "split" provision) of the Tenth Schedule was a central reform brought about by the 91st Amendment Act to prevent misuse of this exemption.

Diagram-Based Question:

Analyze the following hypothetical structure of a State Council of Ministers after the 91st Amendment Act and identify if it complies with the constitutional provisions. The State Assembly has a strength of 200 members.

• Chief Minister: 1
• Cabinet Ministers: 25
• Ministers of State: 10

Total Ministers = 36

Question: Is the size of this Council of Ministers constitutionally valid? Explain with reference to the relevant Article.

Answer and Explanation: No, the size of this Council of Ministers is not constitutionally valid.

• Relevant Constitutional Provision: Article 164(1A) of the Constitution, inserted by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003, states that the total number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in the Council of Ministers in a State shall not exceed 15% of the total strength of the Legislative Assembly of that State.
• Calculation:
  • Total strength of the State Assembly = 200 members.
  • Maximum permissible strength of the Council of Ministers = 15% of 200 = (15/100) * 200 = 30 members.
• Analysis: The proposed Council of Ministers has 36 members (1 CM + 25 Cabinet Ministers + 10 Ministers of State). This number (36) exceeds the constitutionally mandated maximum limit of 30 members.

Recommended Books

You can explore these highly recommended resources for a deeper understanding.

• Environment & Ecology for Civil Services Examination 6ed - by Majid Husain
• Indian Economy: Performance and Policies - by Uma Kapila
• Understanding Economic Development NCERT Book - NCERT
• Skill Development and Employment in India - by Subramanian Swamy