Role of Parliament in India: Functions, Challenges, and the Path to Reform (Part 02)

While the Indian Parliament was envisioned as the grand deliberative chamber of the world's largest democracy, its operational reality has increasingly diverged from its constitutional ideals. As a continuation of our deep dive into the legislative organ of the state, Part 02 critically evaluates the structural and systemic challenges plaguing the Parliament, examines the evolving and contentious jurisprudence of parliamentary privileges—highlighted by the Supreme Court's landmark 2024 ruling—and charts a comprehensive, actionable roadmap for institutional reform.

1. Structural and Operational Challenges Plaguing the Indian Parliament

In recent decades, observers, scholars, and jurists have pointed to a visible "decline of Parliament." Rather than acting as a robust check on the Executive, the legislature has frequently found itself bypassed, neutralized, or paralyzed. Below is a detailed analytical breakdown of the key structural and operational challenges facing the institution.

                  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │      SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT       │
                  └────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
                                               │
         ┌───────────────────────┬─────────────┴─────────────┬───────────────────────┐
         ▼                       ▼                           ▼                       ▼
┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐
│ OPERATIONAL     │     │ SCRUTINY        │         │ EXECUTIVE       │     │ STRUCTURAL      │
│ DECLINE         │     │ DEFICIT         │         │ AGGRANDIZEMENT  │     │ CONSTRAINTS     │
└────────┬────────┘     └────────┬────────┘         └────────┬────────┘     └────────┬────────┘
         │                       │                           │                       │
         ├─ Fewer Sitting Days   ├─ Bypassing Standing       ├─ Money Bill Abuse     ├─ Anti-Defection Whip
         │                          Committees               │  (Art. 110)           │  (10th Schedule)
         └─ Disruptions &        │                           │                       │
            Guillotined Budgets  └─ Hasty Legislation        └─ "Ordinance Raj"      └─ Lack of Dedicated
                                    (No Pre-Legislative consultation)                   Research Support

1.1 The Decline in Sittings and the Culture of Disruptions

• Shrinking Calendar: Unlike the British House of Commons, which sits for around 140 to 150 days a year, or the US Congress, which is in session for over 100 days, the Indian Parliament's sitting days have steadily declined. In the 1950s, the Lok Sabha met for an average of 120 days a year; in recent years, this has dwindled to an average of 60 to 70 days.
• The Cost of Disruptions: Parliamentary proceedings are frequently stalled by protests, sloganeering, and disruptions. This has led to a steep decline in productivity, with valuable hours of the Question Hour (the prime tool for executive accountability) being lost.
• The "Guillotine" Abuse: Because of limited debate time and persistent disruptions, the vast majority of the Union Budget's departmental demands for grants are passed without any discussion using the "Guillotine" mechanism. This effectively means hundreds of thousands of crores of public money are sanctioned without parliamentary scrutiny.

1.2 Bypassing Parliamentary Committees (The "Fast-Track" Menace)

Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) were established in 1993 to act as the "mini-parliaments" where bills are scrutinized away from party-political posturing. However, there has been a sharp decline in referring bills to these committees:

• In the 14th Lok Sabha (2004–2009), approximately 60% of bills were referred to standing committees.
• In the 15th Lok Sabha (2009–2014), this figure rose to 71%.
• In the 16th Lok Sabha (2014–2019), it plummeted to 25%.
• In the 17th Lok Sabha (2019–2024), the referral rate dropped even further, hovering near 10% to 15%.

When bills are passed without committee scrutiny, the legal drafts suffer from structural loopholes, leading to increased litigation, public protests, and executive rollbacks (e.g., the Farm Laws of 2020).

1.3 The "Ordinance Raj" (Subverting Article 123)

Article 123 vests the President with the power to promulgate ordinances during recess of Parliament, intended strictly for "extraordinary, urgent situations."

• The Challenge: Executive governments have increasingly used the ordinance route to bypass legislative scrutiny for politically sensitive or complex laws, presenting Parliament with a fait accompli when it reconvenes.
• Judicial Red Lines: The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck warning notes:
  • In D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987), the Court ruled that the repromulgation of ordinances without placing them before the legislature is a subversion of the democratic process and a "fraud on the Constitution."
  • In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017), a 7-judge bench ruled that the power to issue ordinances is not an alternative source of law-making but an emergency provision, and the failure to place an ordinance before the legislature is a violation of constitutional trust.

1.4 Strategic Misclassification of Bills (The Money Bill Controversy)

• The Constitutional Loophole: Under Article 110(1), a bill is deemed a Money Bill only if it contains provisions dealing exclusively with taxation, public expenditure, borrowing, or financial obligations of the government.
• The Mischief: Since the Rajya Sabha (where the ruling coalition may lack a majority) has no power to reject or amend a Money Bill (it can only recommend changes within 14 days), the Executive has strategically classified complex, non-financial legislations as Money Bills.
• Key Flashpoints: The certification of the Aadhaar Act, 2016 and amendments to tribunals via the Finance Act, 2017 as Money Bills sparked intense legal battles.
• Judicial Stance: In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2018), the dissenting opinion of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud famously termed the classification of the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill a "fraud on the Constitution" and a "subversion of bicameralism." The constitutional validity of using Finance Acts to alter tribunal rules is currently referred to a larger 7-judge bench of the Supreme Court to lay down definitive guidelines on Article 110.

1.5 The Paradox of the Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule)

Introduced by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, the Tenth Schedule sought to curb the opportunistic "Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram" political defection culture. However, it has had a severe unintended consequence:

• The Hollowing Out of MP Independence: The law empowers political party leaders to issue a "Whip" on every bill and motion. If an MP votes against the party line, or even abstains, they face immediate disqualification.
• The Consequence: This has reduced individual legislators to mere voting machines, destroying the space for "conscience voting," cross-party consensus, and constructive internal dissent. MPs are forced to prioritize party loyalty over their duty to their constituents.

1.6 Lack of Specialized Research Support

Unlike the US Congress, which has the highly specialized, non-partisan Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Indian MPs lack institutional research assistants.

• The Parliamentary Library and Research Service (LARRDIS) is severely under-resourced and under-staffed.
• This creates an information asymmetry where the Executive—backed by the entire civil service apparatus—holds a monopoly on data and technical expertise, leaving MPs ill-equipped to challenge complex policy formulations.

2. Parliamentary Privileges (Articles 105 & 194) and the Evolving Jurisprudence

Parliamentary privileges are special rights, immunities, and exemptions enjoyed by each House of Parliament, its committees, and its members collectively and individually. Designed to ensure that legislators can perform their duties without fear, harassment, or civil/criminal obstruction, these privileges have long been a source of constitutional tension.

2.1 Anatomy of Parliamentary Privileges

                             ┌────────────────────────────────────────┐
                             │       PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES         │
                             └───────────────────┬────────────────────┘
                                                 │
                    ┌────────────────────────────┴────────────────────────────┐
                    ▼                                                         ▼
      ┌───────────────────────────┐                             ┌───────────────────────────┐
      │   INDIVIDUAL PRIVILEGES   │                             │   COLLECTIVE PRIVILEGES   │
      └─────────────┬─────────────┘                             └─────────────┬─────────────┘
                    │                                                         │
       ├─ Freedom of Speech in Parliament                        ├─ Right to Publish Debates & Reports
       │  (Art. 105(1) & 105(2))                                 │  (and exclude others from publishing)
       │                                                         │
       ├─ Freedom from Arrest in Civil Cases                     ├─ Right to Exclude Strangers
       │  (40 days before, during, and 40 days                   │  (Secret Sittings)
       │   after a session)                                      │
       │                                                         ├─ Right to Punish for Contempt/Breach
       └─ Exempt from Jury Service                               │  of Privilege (of members & outsiders)
          (Refuse to give evidence when                          │
           Parliament is in session)                             └─ Courts Barred from inquiring into
                                                                    proceedings of the House (Art. 122)

2.2 The Great Conflict: Privileges vs. Fundamental Rights

The Constitution does not explicitly codify these privileges. Instead, Articles 105(3) and 194(3) state that until defined by Parliament by law, they shall be those of the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom at the commencement of the Constitution (January 26, 1950). This lack of codification often creates a head-on collision with the Fundamental Rights of citizens, particularly the freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)) and personal liberty (Article 21).

Evolving Judicial Landmark Cases:

1. M.S.M. Sharma v. Sri Krishna Sinha (1959) (The Searchlight Case):
   • Issue: Can a legislative assembly prohibit the publication of its debates, even if it violates a journalist's right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a)?
   • Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the privileges of the House under Article 194(3) are not subject to Article 19(1)(a). The general provision of free speech must yield to the special provision of legislative privilege.
2. In re, Under Article 143 (Keshav Singh Case, 1965):
   • Issue: Can the High Court entertain a habeas corpus petition of a citizen jailed by the Legislative Assembly for contempt of the House?
   • Ruling: The Supreme Court asserted that the judiciary has the power to examine whether a breach of privilege has occurred and if it violates Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). The Court held that the legislature cannot act as an absolute judge in its own cause if it infringes upon a citizen's basic right to liberty.
3. Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker (2007):
   • Issue: Can the Supreme Court judicially review the expulsion of MPs involved in the "Cash-for-Query" scandal?
   • Ruling: The Court confirmed that while the House has the collective privilege to expel members for conduct unbecoming of a legislator, such actions are subject to judicial review if they are found to be illegal, unconstitutional, or suffering from gross procedural irregularities.

2.3 The 2024 Landmark Shift: Sita Soren v. Union of India

For over two decades, legislative immunity in bribery cases was governed by the controversial ruling in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998). In that 3:2 majority decision, the Supreme Court had held that legislators who took bribes and voted in accordance with the briber's instructions were immune from criminal prosecution under Article 105(2) or 194(2) because their vote was cast "in respect of" proceedings in the House. Paradoxically, a legislator who took a bribe but voted otherwise or did not vote at all was not protected.

On March 4, 2024, a 7-judge Constitution Bench headed by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud unanimously overruled the P.V. Narasimha Rao judgment in the historic case of Sita Soren v. Union of India.

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        SITA SOREN v. UNION OF INDIA (2024)                             │
│                              [7-Judge Bench Ruling]                                    │
├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  OVERRULED PRECEDENT:                                                                  │
│  ❌ P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998) which gave immunity to bribe-taking legislators. │
├────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  KEY RULINGS & DOCTRINES ESTABLISHED:                                                  │
│                                                                                        │
│  1. NO IMMUNITY FOR CORRUPTION:                                                        │
│     Articles 105(2) & 194(2) do not shield legislators from criminal charges           │
│     such as bribery, as corruption is not essential to the legislative process.        │
│                                                                                        │
│  2. THE TWO-FOLD TEST FOR LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY:                                        │
│     To claim immunity, a privilege must satisfy:                                       │
│     • Test A (Collective Link): The claim must be tethered to the collective           │
│       functioning of the House.                                                        │
│     • Test B (Functional Essentiality): The privilege must be essential to preserve    │
│       the freedom of speech and vote of a legislator.                                  │
│                                                                                        │
│  3. INDEPENDENCE OF THE OFFENCE:                                                       │
│     The offense of bribery is complete the moment the bribe is accepted/obtained;      │
│     it does not depend on whether the legislator actually performs their end           │
│     of the bargain inside the House.                                                   │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Key Interpretations and Impact of the Sita Soren Judgment:

• The Completion of the Offence: The Court clarified that under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the offense of bribery is complete the moment a legislator accepts or agrees to accept an "undue advantage". Whether they actually deliver the promised speech or cast the promised vote inside the House is completely immaterial.
• Formulation of the "Two-Fold Test": The Court established a strict structural test to determine when legislative immunity can be claimed under Article 105(2) or 194(2):
  1. Is the assertion of privilege tethered to the collective functioning of the House?
  2. Is the privilege essential to the discharge of the legislator's duties without fear of reprisal or impediment?
• Eradication of the Moral Paradox: The judgment corrected a historical anomaly that protected corrupt legislators while exposing honest ones to prosecution, thereby reinforcing public trust in democratic institutions and restoring the moral integrity of parliamentary speech.

2.4 The Codification Debate: Should Privileges be Codified?

The debate on whether Parliament should enact a comprehensive law codifying its privileges has raged since the Constituent Assembly.

3. Comparative Analysis: Indian Parliament vs. UK Parliament (Westminster Model)

While India adopted the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy, the constitutional architecture of the two nations diverged significantly to suit their respective socio-political realities.

4. The Path to Reform: Transforming the "Temple of Democracy"

Restoring the Parliament's position as the premier forum for deliberation and executive accountability requires a structural overhaul. Below are key institutional reforms proposed by various commissions, committees, and constitutional experts.

                  ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
                  │                 PARLIAMENTARY REFORMS                   │
                  └────────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────┘
                                               │
         ┌───────────────────────┬─────────────┴─────────────┬───────────────────────┐
         ▼                       ▼                           ▼                       ▼
┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐         ┌─────────────────┐     ┌─────────────────┐
│ OPERATIONAL     │     │ SCRUTINY        │         │ EXECUTIVE       │     │ STRUCTURAL      │
│ EFFICIENCY      │     │ STRENGTHENING   │         │ BALANCING       │     │ INDEPENDENCE    │
└────────┬────────┘     └────────┬────────┘         └────────┬────────┘     └────────┬────────┘
         │                       │                           │                       │
         ├─ 120-Day Minimum      ├─ Mandatory Committee      ├─ Restrict Ordinance   ├─ Reform the Speaker's
         │  Sitting Law             Referrals                  Re-promulgations      │  Office (UK Model)
         │                       │                           │                       │
         └─ Formal "Opposition   └─ Post-Legislative Impact  └─ Reform the Tenth     └─ Establish a non-partisan
            Days"                   Assessments                 Schedule Whip Rules     Parliamentary Budget Office

4.1 Structural and Operational Reforms

1. Mandating Minimum Sittings: Parliament should sit for at least 120 days a year, as recommended by the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC). This should be legally mandated through a constitutional amendment.
2. Institutionalizing "Opposition Days": Mimicking the British model, specific days in every session should be reserved for the Opposition to set the agenda and lead discussions on critical issues, preventing the need for disruptions to force a debate.
3. Strict Rules on Disruptions: Implement a productivity-linked pay structure for MPs, alongside strict, non-partisan enforcement of suspensions by the Speaker for persistent disruption of proceedings.

4.2 Strengthening the Committee System

1. Mandatory Referral of Bills: All bills (except formal or emergency ones) should be referred to Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) by default. Passing a bill without committee review should require a formal, supermajority vote in the House.
2. Public Participation & Open Hearings: Standing Committees should hold public hearings and invite feedback from civil society, experts, and stakeholders to democratize the law-making process.
3. Post-Legislative Impact Assessment: Committees should be mandated to review laws 3–5 years after their enactment to evaluate their operational efficacy, unintended consequences, and resource utilization.

4.3 Reforming the Anti-Defection Law (Tenth Schedule)

1. Narrowing the Scope of the Whip: The Law Commission of India (170th Report) and the Dinesh Goswami Committee recommended that the party whip should be restricted only to votes where the stability of the government is directly at stake (e.g., No-Confidence Motions, Confidence Motions, and Money Bills). For all other legislative matters, MPs must be allowed a free "conscience vote."
2. Deciding Authority: The power to decide on defection petitions should be stripped from the Speaker, who is often politically biased. It should be vested in the President/Governor, acting on the binding advice of the Election Commission of India, or an independent tribunal as suggested by the Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020).

4.4 Transforming the Office of the Speaker

1. Adopting the British Model: Upon election, the Speaker must formally resign from their political party. They must be insulated from partisan politics, and their return to Parliament should be supported by a convention of uncontested elections.
2. Impartial Disqualification Decisions: To restore the dignity of the Office, the Speaker should have no role in deciding disqualification cases under the Tenth Schedule or classifying bills under Article 110 without a multi-party consensus committee's sign-off.

4.5 Addressing Information Asymmetry

1. Establishment of a Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO): Like the CBO in the US, an independent, non-partisan PBO must be established in India. It would provide MPs with objective, high-quality, and independent economic and fiscal analysis of budgets and bills.
2. Institutionalizing Legislative Assistants: Scale up initiatives like the Legislative Assistants to Members of Parliament (LAMP) fellowship to ensure every MP has access to professional research staff to analyze bills, draft questions, and engage in high-quality legislative work.

5. Interactive Learning & Practice Hub

To test your conceptual comprehension of the functions, challenges, and judicial developments surrounding the Indian Parliament, work through the curated practice module below.

5.1 High-Yield Multiple-Choice Questions (MCQs)

Q1. Consider the following statements regarding the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024):

1. It unanimously overruled the 5-judge bench decision in the P.V. Narasimha Rao (1998) case.
2. It held that the offense of bribery is complete only when the legislator performs the agreed act of speech or voting inside the House.
3. It established a two-fold test to determine whether a claim of parliamentary privilege is sustainable under Article 105 or 194.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

• (a) 1 and 2 only
• (b) 2 and 3 only
• (c) 1 and 3 only
• (d) 1, 2, and 3

Q2. With reference to the "Money Bill" under Article 110 of the Constitution of India, consider the following statements:

1. A bill is deemed to be a Money Bill if it contains provisions dealing exclusively with matters specified in Article 110(1)(a) to (g).
2. The President's recommendation is mandatory to introduce a Money Bill in either the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha.
3. The Supreme Court's majority opinion in the K.S. Puttaswamy (2018) case held that the Speaker’s certification of a bill as a Money Bill is immune to judicial review.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

• (a) 1 only
• (b) 1 and 2 only
• (c) 3 only
• (d) 1, 2, and 3

Q3. The constitutional power to issue an Ordinance under Article 123 is subject to which of the following limitations based on Supreme Court judgments?

1. An ordinance can be promulgated only when both Houses of Parliament are not in session.
2. The satisfaction of the President in issuing an ordinance can be challenged in a court of law on the ground of malafide intent.
3. The repromulgation of an ordinance without placing it before the legislature is a violation of the constitutional process.

Select the correct answer using the code given below:

• (a) 1 and 2 only
• (b) 2 and 3 only
• (c) 1 and 3 only
• (d) 1, 2, and 3

5.2 Scenario-Based Applied Learning Questions

Scenario A: The Speaker and the Whip Conflict

The Context: A controversial Bill seeking to deregulate agricultural land acquisition is introduced in the Lok Sabha. Member of Parliament (MP) "X" believes the Bill is detrimental to their farming constituency. The political party to which MP "X" belongs issues a strict three-line whip to vote in favor of the Bill. MP "X", choosing to represent their constituents' interests, votes against the Bill on the floor of the House.

Questions for Critical Thinking:

1. What are the constitutional consequences of MP "X"'s vote under the Tenth Schedule?
2. Does MP "X" enjoy immunity under Article 105(2) against immediate disqualification if they argue that they exercised their "freedom of speech" on the floor?
3. How does this scenario highlight the core tension between the representative duties of an MP and the Anti-Defection Law?

5.3 Chronological & Association Exercise

Match the landmark Supreme Court judgments with the constitutional principles they established:

Correct Association:

• A ➔ 3
• B ➔ 1
• C ➔ 2
• D ➔ 4

5.4 Diagram-Based Reasoning Question

Review the simplified flowchart below illustrating how a non-emergency Bill can bypass standing committees:

[Bill Drafted by Ministry] 
          │
          ▼
[Introduced in Lok Sabha] ──(Skip Committee Referral?)──► [Immediate Debate & Passage] 
          │                                                       │
          │ (Standard Path)                                       │ (Accelerated Path)
          ▼                                                       ▼
[Standing Committee Scrutiny]                             [Sent to Rajya Sabha]
(Detailed stakeholder review,                             (Minimal deliberation,
 amendments, & report)                                     passed under party whip)
          │                                                       │
          ▼                                                       ▼
[Bill Passed with Amendments]                             [President's Assent ➔ LAW]
                                                          (High risk of legal challenges/
                                                           public backlash)

Evaluate the Flowchart:

1. Identify the point in the legislative chain where the bypassing of standing committees creates an "analytical blindspot" for the state.
2. Based on the flowchart and the arguments in Section 4.2, what constitutional reforms would convert the "Accelerated Path" from an executive option into a rare, judicially or procedurally monitored exception?

6. Conclusion & Key Takeaways

The Indian Parliament stands at a critical historical juncture. While the physical infrastructure has been modernized, the institutional, procedural, and ethical frameworks require deep, structural regeneration.

Key Takeaways:

• Scrutiny Deficit: The steep decline in referring bills to standing committees (down to ~10%) and the shrinking number of sitting days (~60 days) undermine the Parliament's role as a check on executive power.
• Privileges Redefined: The 2024 Sita Soren judgment is a watershed moment in constitutional jurisprudence, ending the era of criminal immunity for bribe-taking legislators and laying down a strict functional test for parliamentary privileges.
• Structural Overhaul Needed: Effective reform requires limiting the scope of the Tenth Schedule whip, institutionalizing "Opposition Days," adopting the UK model of an impartial Speaker, and creating an independent Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to resolve the information asymmetry between the Executive and the Legislature.

Recommended Readings for Advanced Studies:

1. NCRWC (National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution) Report (2002) – Chapters on the Legislature and the Committee System.
2. Law Commission of India (170th & 255th Reports) – Recommendations on Electoral Reforms and the Tenth Schedule.
3. Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024) – Supreme Court Judgment (Full Text).

Recommended Books

You can explore these highly recommended resources for a deeper understanding.

• Indian Polity (English) by M Laxmikanth for UPSC CSE 2025 | 7th edition (latest) | Civil Services Exam - Prelims, Mains and Interview | State PSCs exams/ PCS exams - by M Laxmikanth
• Oswaal NCERT One For All Book for UPSC & State PSCs | Indian Polity Classes 6-12 - by Oswaal Editorial Board
• Bharat Ki Rajvyavastha (भारत की राजव्यवस्था) - M Laxmikanth for UPSC CSE